The Gurkhas of 1943
"We were too young, both officers and other ranks alike, we were too young, just as the 13th Kings were far too old." (Lieutenant Denis Gudgeon, March 2nd, 2008).
For almost two hundred years now, potential Gurkha recruits have made their way down the winding hillside paths of Nepal, in the hope of joining the British Army. They come from a land which stretches five hundred miles along the northern most borders of India and one hundred miles back to the Himalayan Mountains. The land is one of majestic beauty, likened very much to Alpine terrain with it's pine forests, sprawling meadows and crystal clear springs.
Nepal has many tribes, and amongst these groups there are numerous clans. A Gurkha always adds this 'clan' to his given name, giving us such titles as Tilbahadur Thapa, Dilbahadur Gurung or Dhan Bahadur Rai. The title bahadur has been used throughout Asia for centuries and roughly translated means warrior.
And so, it was from this small independent Kingdom that the third battalion of the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles were taken, tasked to perform one half of the infantry duties for 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in 1942/43.
Nepal has many tribes, and amongst these groups there are numerous clans. A Gurkha always adds this 'clan' to his given name, giving us such titles as Tilbahadur Thapa, Dilbahadur Gurung or Dhan Bahadur Rai. The title bahadur has been used throughout Asia for centuries and roughly translated means warrior.
And so, it was from this small independent Kingdom that the third battalion of the 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles were taken, tasked to perform one half of the infantry duties for 77th Indian Infantry Brigade in 1942/43.
The roots of the 2nd Gurkha regiment go all the way back to 1815, when it became the first Gurkha unit to fight for the British Army calling itself the 'Sirmoor Battalion'. The Gurkha soldier proved his worth and legendary bravery almost immediately and fought for the British cause in such places as the North West Frontier, Afghanistan and the various conflicts within India itself.
(Pictured to the left is the 2nd Gurkha Rifles cap badge and crest. It depicts the Prince of Wales feathers with the motto 'Ich dien', which basically means 'I serve'. The badge of the 2nd Gurkhas is the only one from all the Gurkha regiments not to include the Kukri knife within it's make up).
In World War One the unit was used in many theatres, often fighting together with other Gurkha regiments in places like Neuve Chapelle in France, Egypt and Mesopotamia. It too experienced the horrors of trench warfare in France and Belgium, something the little men of Nepal found both frustrating and alien to their forthright fighting spirit.
In WW2 the regiment saw it's battalions suffer very contrasting experiences in various theatres. The 1st battalion began it's service in Persia, then on to Cyprus, before moving to North Africa as part of 7th Brigade and fought at El Alamein. It then moved on to the Italian mainland where it took part in the bloody battles around Monte Cassino. The 2nd battalion suffered the ignominy of being held prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese, after defeat in Malaya.
The 3rd battalion was raised during the war and consisted of very young and very raw recruits. It was also short of good calibre and experienced officers to organise these new Gurkha riflemen. In early 1942 the battalion only possessed a handful of officers that could speak 'Gurkhali', the native language of the Gurkhas and even fewer men who had seen active service before. Nevertheless, and as you will see, these soldiers performed their role exceedingly well on operation Longcloth, keeping up the proud tradition of the 2nd Gurkha regiment. I should mention here that there was representation from other Gurkha regiments on Longcloth, none more so than the valiant muleteers from the 10th Gurkha Rifles, who led their charges with great courage and skill within all seven of the columns in 1943.
After the war was over and Indian independence was granted in 1947, the 2nd Gurkha Rifles was one of the Gurkha regiments retained within the British Army, the others were the 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkha Rifles.
As a footnote to this brief outline of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles history, I need to mention the regimental hill station at Dehra Dun. This is the traditional location for Gurkhas who are either recuperating from recent active service or are retiring from the regiment altogether. Dehra Dun is closely connected with the regiment as it is situated just a few miles from Sirmoor, the ancestral home of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles. Retiring soldiers found it almost impossible to return to their original Nepalese homelands after long service in the British Army. Dehra Dun was set up to accommodate both these veterans and their families. (Seen below is the hill station at Dehra Dun, as it looks today). After independence the regiment was transferred out of Dehra Dun on the 18th February 1948 and moved over to the Malay Peninsula, taking up their new residence at Ipoh. This move held great irony for many members of the regiment, as the Ashby Road Barracks in Ipoh was where they had been held as POW's by the Japanese during the war.
(Pictured to the left is the 2nd Gurkha Rifles cap badge and crest. It depicts the Prince of Wales feathers with the motto 'Ich dien', which basically means 'I serve'. The badge of the 2nd Gurkhas is the only one from all the Gurkha regiments not to include the Kukri knife within it's make up).
In World War One the unit was used in many theatres, often fighting together with other Gurkha regiments in places like Neuve Chapelle in France, Egypt and Mesopotamia. It too experienced the horrors of trench warfare in France and Belgium, something the little men of Nepal found both frustrating and alien to their forthright fighting spirit.
In WW2 the regiment saw it's battalions suffer very contrasting experiences in various theatres. The 1st battalion began it's service in Persia, then on to Cyprus, before moving to North Africa as part of 7th Brigade and fought at El Alamein. It then moved on to the Italian mainland where it took part in the bloody battles around Monte Cassino. The 2nd battalion suffered the ignominy of being held prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese, after defeat in Malaya.
The 3rd battalion was raised during the war and consisted of very young and very raw recruits. It was also short of good calibre and experienced officers to organise these new Gurkha riflemen. In early 1942 the battalion only possessed a handful of officers that could speak 'Gurkhali', the native language of the Gurkhas and even fewer men who had seen active service before. Nevertheless, and as you will see, these soldiers performed their role exceedingly well on operation Longcloth, keeping up the proud tradition of the 2nd Gurkha regiment. I should mention here that there was representation from other Gurkha regiments on Longcloth, none more so than the valiant muleteers from the 10th Gurkha Rifles, who led their charges with great courage and skill within all seven of the columns in 1943.
After the war was over and Indian independence was granted in 1947, the 2nd Gurkha Rifles was one of the Gurkha regiments retained within the British Army, the others were the 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkha Rifles.
As a footnote to this brief outline of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles history, I need to mention the regimental hill station at Dehra Dun. This is the traditional location for Gurkhas who are either recuperating from recent active service or are retiring from the regiment altogether. Dehra Dun is closely connected with the regiment as it is situated just a few miles from Sirmoor, the ancestral home of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles. Retiring soldiers found it almost impossible to return to their original Nepalese homelands after long service in the British Army. Dehra Dun was set up to accommodate both these veterans and their families. (Seen below is the hill station at Dehra Dun, as it looks today). After independence the regiment was transferred out of Dehra Dun on the 18th February 1948 and moved over to the Malay Peninsula, taking up their new residence at Ipoh. This move held great irony for many members of the regiment, as the Ashby Road Barracks in Ipoh was where they had been held as POW's by the Japanese during the war.
Gurkha Chindit Training
The Gurkha element of 77th Brigade met up with their British comrades in June and July of 1942, arriving at a place called Patharia in the Central Provinces of India. They had been drawn into the regiment just weeks beforehand and were extremely young (sometimes barely passed their sixteenth birthday) and inexperienced. Adding to the lack of experience was the shortage of seasoned and battle hardened officers to lead the new battalion. By August that year the new Gurkha battalion had been allocated to the various columns within 77th Brigade, but a real difficulty with communication and language made their integration anything other than smooth. In fact at this stage only two officers were able to speak fluent Gurkhali and this communication breakdown would prove critical not only during training, but on the operation itself.
New drafts of officers were brought in from all across India, many of these were only two or three years older than the riflemen they were asked to lead. There was also a real mistrust of Wingate's ideas and methods amongst the Gurkha ranks. They had heard many rumours about this unconventional officer from their superiors back at Army HQ in Delhi and they brought their misgivings with them to Patharia. Some of the new officers took quickly to Wingate and his new ideas about Long Range Penetration, but others held on to the view that he was a misguided and self-obsessed maverick.
The ordinary Gurkha rifleman did not readily take to the special and unconventional training at hand. He had been brought up to face his enemy in combat and was willing to die hard in any conflict or action. He found being split up into small units difficult, especially if he found himself mainly amongst the British troops and their columns. The emphasis on the 'hit and run' tactic was also something that did not come naturally to the warrior psyche of the Gurkha troops and dispersal drill was misinterpreted as running away. This last problem was to lead to massive confusion on the operation in 1943 when column 2 found themselves in trouble at a place called Kyaikthin in early March. Dispersal was called during a major action against the Japanese near the village rail station, half the Gurkha troops moved forward to the agreed dispersal rendezvous, but disastrously the other half turned round and headed back to India.
The small stature of the Gurkhas also caused problems during Chindit training and on the operation alike. The Burma theatre was in general a 'little man's' war, especially when you think of the size of the average British 'Tommy' back then, combined with the Gurkhas, Burma riflemen and obviously the Japanese themselves. Chindit training relied heavily on rivercraft and swimming was an essential skill that hardly any of the infantry element of 77th Brigade possessed. Many times on operation Longcloth a six foot tall British officer would wade out across a fast flowing Burmese river, never considering the difficulties a man of shorter height would have in following him. At one point during training a flash flood caused one Gurkha unit to spend two days and nights stranded and nesting in the treetops of a nearby wood, here they waited for the raging river levels to subside. The newly issued 'Everest' backpack was also difficult for the shorter Gurkha soldier to come to terms with, in fact most of the men discarded this new invention in favour of the old style Army pack.
Food supplies and how to cook them were a real concern for the logistical organisers of operation Longcloth and the training program beforehand. The Gurkhas would not eat beef and so mutton was purchased to subsidize their rations. Rice was their staple and historically the Gurkha had needed a mess break of two hours in order to cook his food in large traditional cauldrons. Wingate knew this could never be possible once the columns were behind enemy lines inside Burma, he had devised a routine whereby men would prepare their meals in pairs, using small mess tins and taking only a matter of minutes to complete. Mike Calvert had been talking over this very problem with Wingate one afternoon, suddenly his commander took the matter into his own hands. This is how Major Calvert remembers the moment:
"He (Wingate) put his alarm clock down, started a fire with dry sticks from his own pack, waited until he had really got it going, then measured out some rice from a spare sock, we always carried rice in our spare socks, he then put the rice into a mess tin of water. Everybody sat around watching for about twenty minutes, while he hummed to himself (Jewish or Arabic songs by all accounts). By then the water had boiled away. He took a spoon to the rice, stirred it, blew on it and tasted a bit. After his first spoonful this great contented smile spread across his face and the Gurkhas were converted".
There can be no doubt that the Gurkha sections of 77th Brigade were used by Wingate as a 'feint' to confuse the Japanese about the real route to be taken by and intentions of the Northern Section and their demolition squads. Columns 1 and 2 were sent off in a southerly direction as the operation began in February 1943 with the direct instructions to make themselves known to the enemy and the local village spies, as they moved openly toward the rail station at Kyaikthin. Some commentators have remarked upon the callous nature in which Wingate used the Gurkhas as a diversion and suggested that he would never have dared use the 13th Kings in the same way.
There is no doubt that Gurkha casualties were high from these two columns, but when you analyse the overall casualties for the operation, they do not stand out as overly exceptional. The ultimate commitment and bravery of the Gurkha Rifleman on Operation Longcloth cannot be called in to question and the men of the 3/2 Gurkha Rifles upheld the traditions of the regiment. As a sub note here, we must not forget that the majority of the muleteers (mule handlers) on operation Longcloth were drawn from the 10th regiment of the Gurkha Rifles and had travelled down to Saugor with their charges by train in the late summer of 1942.
Aftermath and the Way Forward
Harold James in his book 'Across the Threshold of Battle', adequately describes the re-adjustment period for 3/2 Gurkha after Operation Longcloth and there subsequent re-engagement with the Japanese in the Arakan region of Burma in 1944.
When the Chindits were given the order to withdraw, Wingate had stressed the importance of bringing back men who were valuable because of the experience they had gained in Long Range Penetration operations. But a very small proportion continued in that type of operation.
The battered 3/2nd Gurkha Rifles had to rebuild. Its morale was understandably very low and the British and Gurkha Officers faced a difficult rehabilitation task. The battalion had lost some 400 men, including 74 POWs. But many of the Gurkhas had displayed great courage and physical endurance in an action which was quite foreign to a battalion under active service conditions, and there was still an abundance of excellent officer material to build on — at least three, two from 3 Column, eventually became Gurkha Majors.
There were also some splendid British Officers who rallied round. When Brigadier Reggie Hutton heard that the 3/2nd Gurkhas needed a CO, he immediately volunteered to drop from his rank as Brigadier to Lieutenant-Colonel, and with him came Philip Panton as second-in-command. 'From the moment of their arrival,' said Nick Neill, 'our fortunes never looked back.'
Both men were of the Regiment, the men took to them at once. The old kaida (customs or traditions) was restored and the Gurkhas were once again commanded completely by British Officers of the Regiment. Morale soared, training became practical and realistic again, and every man knew that when we went back to war with the Japanese again, we would kick them from here to eternity.
From the ashes of the Chindit expedition a superb front line battalion arose, the ultimate Jap-killing machine in 25th Indian Division, fighting with great distinction in the Arakan, with one of the Gurkhas winning the VC.
During the early autumn of 1943, Brigadier G.A. Bain, after a visit to the training camp, wrote:
I came fearing that I would find them depressed and defeatist, but it was the most cheering experience I have ever had. There they were, big, fat, healthy, cheery and on top of their form. One could pick out the men who had been through the Chindit show, not by selecting the men who looked ill and fed up but quite the reverse. They were the ones who looked fit, tough and full of confidence. The marvellous fact was that in spite of all they had been through not a single man of the Battalion has failed to return from leave, except those who are too ill to present themselves.
Pictured below is a typical Gurkha column unit.
New drafts of officers were brought in from all across India, many of these were only two or three years older than the riflemen they were asked to lead. There was also a real mistrust of Wingate's ideas and methods amongst the Gurkha ranks. They had heard many rumours about this unconventional officer from their superiors back at Army HQ in Delhi and they brought their misgivings with them to Patharia. Some of the new officers took quickly to Wingate and his new ideas about Long Range Penetration, but others held on to the view that he was a misguided and self-obsessed maverick.
The ordinary Gurkha rifleman did not readily take to the special and unconventional training at hand. He had been brought up to face his enemy in combat and was willing to die hard in any conflict or action. He found being split up into small units difficult, especially if he found himself mainly amongst the British troops and their columns. The emphasis on the 'hit and run' tactic was also something that did not come naturally to the warrior psyche of the Gurkha troops and dispersal drill was misinterpreted as running away. This last problem was to lead to massive confusion on the operation in 1943 when column 2 found themselves in trouble at a place called Kyaikthin in early March. Dispersal was called during a major action against the Japanese near the village rail station, half the Gurkha troops moved forward to the agreed dispersal rendezvous, but disastrously the other half turned round and headed back to India.
The small stature of the Gurkhas also caused problems during Chindit training and on the operation alike. The Burma theatre was in general a 'little man's' war, especially when you think of the size of the average British 'Tommy' back then, combined with the Gurkhas, Burma riflemen and obviously the Japanese themselves. Chindit training relied heavily on rivercraft and swimming was an essential skill that hardly any of the infantry element of 77th Brigade possessed. Many times on operation Longcloth a six foot tall British officer would wade out across a fast flowing Burmese river, never considering the difficulties a man of shorter height would have in following him. At one point during training a flash flood caused one Gurkha unit to spend two days and nights stranded and nesting in the treetops of a nearby wood, here they waited for the raging river levels to subside. The newly issued 'Everest' backpack was also difficult for the shorter Gurkha soldier to come to terms with, in fact most of the men discarded this new invention in favour of the old style Army pack.
Food supplies and how to cook them were a real concern for the logistical organisers of operation Longcloth and the training program beforehand. The Gurkhas would not eat beef and so mutton was purchased to subsidize their rations. Rice was their staple and historically the Gurkha had needed a mess break of two hours in order to cook his food in large traditional cauldrons. Wingate knew this could never be possible once the columns were behind enemy lines inside Burma, he had devised a routine whereby men would prepare their meals in pairs, using small mess tins and taking only a matter of minutes to complete. Mike Calvert had been talking over this very problem with Wingate one afternoon, suddenly his commander took the matter into his own hands. This is how Major Calvert remembers the moment:
"He (Wingate) put his alarm clock down, started a fire with dry sticks from his own pack, waited until he had really got it going, then measured out some rice from a spare sock, we always carried rice in our spare socks, he then put the rice into a mess tin of water. Everybody sat around watching for about twenty minutes, while he hummed to himself (Jewish or Arabic songs by all accounts). By then the water had boiled away. He took a spoon to the rice, stirred it, blew on it and tasted a bit. After his first spoonful this great contented smile spread across his face and the Gurkhas were converted".
There can be no doubt that the Gurkha sections of 77th Brigade were used by Wingate as a 'feint' to confuse the Japanese about the real route to be taken by and intentions of the Northern Section and their demolition squads. Columns 1 and 2 were sent off in a southerly direction as the operation began in February 1943 with the direct instructions to make themselves known to the enemy and the local village spies, as they moved openly toward the rail station at Kyaikthin. Some commentators have remarked upon the callous nature in which Wingate used the Gurkhas as a diversion and suggested that he would never have dared use the 13th Kings in the same way.
There is no doubt that Gurkha casualties were high from these two columns, but when you analyse the overall casualties for the operation, they do not stand out as overly exceptional. The ultimate commitment and bravery of the Gurkha Rifleman on Operation Longcloth cannot be called in to question and the men of the 3/2 Gurkha Rifles upheld the traditions of the regiment. As a sub note here, we must not forget that the majority of the muleteers (mule handlers) on operation Longcloth were drawn from the 10th regiment of the Gurkha Rifles and had travelled down to Saugor with their charges by train in the late summer of 1942.
Aftermath and the Way Forward
Harold James in his book 'Across the Threshold of Battle', adequately describes the re-adjustment period for 3/2 Gurkha after Operation Longcloth and there subsequent re-engagement with the Japanese in the Arakan region of Burma in 1944.
When the Chindits were given the order to withdraw, Wingate had stressed the importance of bringing back men who were valuable because of the experience they had gained in Long Range Penetration operations. But a very small proportion continued in that type of operation.
The battered 3/2nd Gurkha Rifles had to rebuild. Its morale was understandably very low and the British and Gurkha Officers faced a difficult rehabilitation task. The battalion had lost some 400 men, including 74 POWs. But many of the Gurkhas had displayed great courage and physical endurance in an action which was quite foreign to a battalion under active service conditions, and there was still an abundance of excellent officer material to build on — at least three, two from 3 Column, eventually became Gurkha Majors.
There were also some splendid British Officers who rallied round. When Brigadier Reggie Hutton heard that the 3/2nd Gurkhas needed a CO, he immediately volunteered to drop from his rank as Brigadier to Lieutenant-Colonel, and with him came Philip Panton as second-in-command. 'From the moment of their arrival,' said Nick Neill, 'our fortunes never looked back.'
Both men were of the Regiment, the men took to them at once. The old kaida (customs or traditions) was restored and the Gurkhas were once again commanded completely by British Officers of the Regiment. Morale soared, training became practical and realistic again, and every man knew that when we went back to war with the Japanese again, we would kick them from here to eternity.
From the ashes of the Chindit expedition a superb front line battalion arose, the ultimate Jap-killing machine in 25th Indian Division, fighting with great distinction in the Arakan, with one of the Gurkhas winning the VC.
During the early autumn of 1943, Brigadier G.A. Bain, after a visit to the training camp, wrote:
I came fearing that I would find them depressed and defeatist, but it was the most cheering experience I have ever had. There they were, big, fat, healthy, cheery and on top of their form. One could pick out the men who had been through the Chindit show, not by selecting the men who looked ill and fed up but quite the reverse. They were the ones who looked fit, tough and full of confidence. The marvellous fact was that in spite of all they had been through not a single man of the Battalion has failed to return from leave, except those who are too ill to present themselves.
Pictured below is a typical Gurkha column unit.
Copyright © Steve Fogden 2012.