The Japanese Psyche and Views on Chindit Operations
A Samurai Warrior from the 1800's.
It is difficult, when reading about the actions and behaviour of the typical Japanese guard toward Allied POW’s, not to feel that he was an inhumane and callous monster. Of course, to the survivors of Japanese captivity in WW2 this is exactly how he will be remembered.
These fighting men of Japan were products of a historical culture that stretched back to the 16th century. This was the time when the aristocracy of Japan was pushed aside by the Bushi warrior, or Samurai as he was to become known in popular legend.
The Bushi were regarded in the Eastern Asiatic region as noblemen of great distinction and honour, very much like the European knights of England and France. From their emergence during the Feudal period of Japanese history, they stood in stark contrast against the hedonisitc courtesan who had held power before.
The Samurai, from their strong base amongst the landed families of Japanese regional society came to control all state, political and military affairs across the country.
Although the Bushi now controlled all Japan, they refused to take up the trappings of the ruling class. In contrast to this, they kept themselves close to the land, the source of their power, and thus kept a grip on the local community and its people. They pronounced the way of the warrior, encouraging horsemanship, weaponry skill and exalted the qualities of loyalty and honour.
It is difficult to relate this code of practice to the Japanese prison guard, who might ruthlessly beat an Allied soldier for not standing or bowing in his presence. But, in an attempt to understand his viewpoint, he held the view that having given up the fight and surrendered you had brought disgrace upon your nation, and were to be treated with contempt and dishonour.
The commanders of the Imperial Japanese Army enforced these views upon their Infantry, and kept the soldiers focussed using the Bushi code. They would often purposely not feed their men from their own stores, forcing the soldier on to take by force not only the enemy’s position, but also his food supply as well. This mirrors the Samurai code of puritan living, which was believed to bring forth greater character and an understanding of one's inner self.
The two symbols of Samurai existence were the sword which stood for his soul, power and creed. The other was the cherry-blossom, which signified the delicacy of life, which if necessary was to be laid down for the greater cause or for one’s master, the Emperor. For the Japanese soldier honour must be upheld, and he would rather die with honour than live and return home in disgrace. This was demonstrated time and time again by Japanese troops in the SE Asia theatre during World War Two.
These fighting men of Japan were products of a historical culture that stretched back to the 16th century. This was the time when the aristocracy of Japan was pushed aside by the Bushi warrior, or Samurai as he was to become known in popular legend.
The Bushi were regarded in the Eastern Asiatic region as noblemen of great distinction and honour, very much like the European knights of England and France. From their emergence during the Feudal period of Japanese history, they stood in stark contrast against the hedonisitc courtesan who had held power before.
The Samurai, from their strong base amongst the landed families of Japanese regional society came to control all state, political and military affairs across the country.
Although the Bushi now controlled all Japan, they refused to take up the trappings of the ruling class. In contrast to this, they kept themselves close to the land, the source of their power, and thus kept a grip on the local community and its people. They pronounced the way of the warrior, encouraging horsemanship, weaponry skill and exalted the qualities of loyalty and honour.
It is difficult to relate this code of practice to the Japanese prison guard, who might ruthlessly beat an Allied soldier for not standing or bowing in his presence. But, in an attempt to understand his viewpoint, he held the view that having given up the fight and surrendered you had brought disgrace upon your nation, and were to be treated with contempt and dishonour.
The commanders of the Imperial Japanese Army enforced these views upon their Infantry, and kept the soldiers focussed using the Bushi code. They would often purposely not feed their men from their own stores, forcing the soldier on to take by force not only the enemy’s position, but also his food supply as well. This mirrors the Samurai code of puritan living, which was believed to bring forth greater character and an understanding of one's inner self.
The two symbols of Samurai existence were the sword which stood for his soul, power and creed. The other was the cherry-blossom, which signified the delicacy of life, which if necessary was to be laid down for the greater cause or for one’s master, the Emperor. For the Japanese soldier honour must be upheld, and he would rather die with honour than live and return home in disgrace. This was demonstrated time and time again by Japanese troops in the SE Asia theatre during World War Two.
Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi.
My Grandfather was a Chindit, a guinea pig to all intents and purposes in 1943. He died a POW in Rangoon Jail. He perished from a mixture of malnutrition, malaria and exhaustion, but died proving the theory of Long Range Penetration. I would hate to believe that his sacrifice was in any way a waste of time in the military sense.
I believe that the Chindit operations were vital in the eventual undoing of Japanese forces in the Burma theatre. The 1943 operation did little on the ground to destroy the Japanese war machine, but it proved a massive morale boost to the Allied troops in India and excellent propaganda for families back home. It also gave Wingate the opportunity and resources to prove his theories more completely in 1944.
It is always useful to understand your enemy and his motivations. In regards to the Japanese with his legendary inscrutability this was often difficult to achieve. However, the Japanese command did hold their own views about the Chindit expeditions and the effect these had on their own aims and objectives.
Here are some of the official views and opinions of the high-ranking Japanese commanding officers present in Burma and beyond during the Chindit operations of 1943 and 1944. These have been taken from the book 'Prisoners of Hope', written by Mike Calvert.
Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi held the appointment of G.O.C. 18th Division in north Burma in the spring of 1943 and later became G.O.C. 15th Army at the time of the Wingate airborne landings. This is what he says of the first operation:
Following the capture of Mandalay on May 1st, 1942, 18th Division was employed in mopping-up operations against remnants of the Chinese Forces in the Southern Shan States in East Burma. In the winter of 1942 15th Division relieved 55th Division and took over the defence of North Burma. Division H.Q. was at Maymyo and I had units under command stationed at Maymyo, Mandalay, Sagaing, Indaw, Mogaung and Myitkyina.
As there had been many cases of 'misunderstanding' between the local people and the Japanese forces, I planned to dispatch units under my command to the Sumprabum area to the north, to the Bhamo area to the east, and to the Chindwin area to the west for propaganda and pacification purposes. I was engaged in the execution of this plan for about one month after the end of February 1943.
The Wingate land counter attack of spring 1943 happened to coincide with the time of the above scheme. I had never anticipated such a risky plan of counter offensive on the part of the British Forces and I was therefore handicapped by the lack of the reserves with which to meet this threat. I had sent two companies which were in the Chindwin area at the time across the Zibyu Taungdan range. Both companies encountered units of the Wingate Force unexpectedly on the way. Units forming the main strength of the Wingate Force were encountered unexpectedly by the Nasu Battalion of 33rd Division and Major Nasu, the commanding officer, was killed in the ensuing action.
The place which the enemy had chosen as his crossing point of the Chindwin, opposite Sittaung, was the borderline of the defence sectors of 18th and 33rd Divisions and was not carefully watched. For this reason the Wingate Force crossed the Chindwin unopposed. Native reports overestimated the strength of this Force and it was therefore difficult to forecast its plans.
The question, whether or not the British would send more counter-attacking forces of this type on a large scale caused me grave concern at that time. Fortunately, such was not the case, and I was able to reduce my disposition to the east.
Since the area that we had to defend was very large in proportion to our strength and consisted mainly of jungle where the enemy could infiltrate freely during the dry season, we abandoned any idea of holding fixed defensive positions and devised measures to meet attacks in any part of the defence area.
General Numata was Chief of Staff Southern Army, which comprised most of South East Asia. His views are therefore more from the strategic standpoint of the overall campaign. He states that the Japanese reaction to the first Wingate expedition was to be offensive-spirited themselves and carry out similar operations against Imphal since:
(a) It was found as a result of the Wingate campaign and the Japanese operations in opposition thereto, that the terrain in North Burma was favourable for guerrilla warfare by small bodies of crack troops, but it was very difficult to defend the territory because the enemy could not easily be engaged. And,
(b) Under the circumstances, it would therefore be best to give up defensive tactics and resort to an offensive to destroy the enemy's bases for counter operations, such as Imphal and Kohima.
NB. Calvert famously recounted: "I had laughed at the gloomy forebodings of some of the officers of the Indian Division through which we had marched on our way to the Chindwin in 1943, 'that all you will do is to stir them up against us', never realizing that it would turn out true."
General Numata said that the Japanese Army did not consider it likely that the enemy would resort regularly to such expeditions. While a section of the staff held the view that another such expedition would be probable, the majority adhered to the first view cited above. Consequently the second Wingate expedition in March 1944 took the Japanese completely by surprise.
There was no special preparation to meet the expedition. He added that because of this lack of preparation, the second Wingate operation threw Japanese units into confusion, and that the higher command, without sufficient information, could only gather local units together more or less indiscriminately. Such time-saving measures resulted in the Japanese forces being repulsed everywhere. It was not until the beginning of April that the Japanese command realized that the enemy was engaged in a serious and large-scale penetrating operation with a powerful corps.
General Numata, on being questioned about the effect of the air-borne landings, stated that:
The reaction of the Japanese Army to this operation was so great that the Japanese 15th Army (the Army which included the three divisions detailed for the Imphal offensive), even thought of sparing from this force attacking Imphal a substantial force to annihilate the enemy unit and thus secure the safety of its rear.
This plan was not carried out. Instead railway units and line of communication guards were collected and deployed against the British troops; while on the other hand the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was guarding the Moulmein area south-east of Rangoon against a possible sea landing, was ordered to proceed north at all speed.
All those units were ordered to advance against the Allied air-borne troops around Mawlu (White City). 15th Army decided that the airborne forces intention was:
(a) To interrupt Japanese supply lines by cutting the Mandalay and Myitkyina railroad.
(b) To disturb the rear communications of the Japanese forces attacking Imphal.
(c) To counteract Japanese propaganda among the Burmese.
We became aware of the main landings on March 9th (some three days after the first wave of airborne Chindits had landed inside Burma) but information available then was insufficient, and we did not think that it was on a large scale. We became aware of its serious proportions only after the Japanese attacks were repulsed.
So in a strange way the actions of Wingate’s first Chindit operation was to confirm the Japanese belief, that attack was the best way forward when dealing with the question of India. This, as history has shown was their eventual undoing in this area and the beginning of the end within the theatre in general.
The first operation was on a small and experimental level, but it had shown what could be done with good organization and training. With the crucial benefit of air supply, the soldiers caused chaos in the midst their enemy, and for the first time began to sow the seeds of doubt into the psyche of their opponent.
I believe that the Chindit operations were vital in the eventual undoing of Japanese forces in the Burma theatre. The 1943 operation did little on the ground to destroy the Japanese war machine, but it proved a massive morale boost to the Allied troops in India and excellent propaganda for families back home. It also gave Wingate the opportunity and resources to prove his theories more completely in 1944.
It is always useful to understand your enemy and his motivations. In regards to the Japanese with his legendary inscrutability this was often difficult to achieve. However, the Japanese command did hold their own views about the Chindit expeditions and the effect these had on their own aims and objectives.
Here are some of the official views and opinions of the high-ranking Japanese commanding officers present in Burma and beyond during the Chindit operations of 1943 and 1944. These have been taken from the book 'Prisoners of Hope', written by Mike Calvert.
Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi held the appointment of G.O.C. 18th Division in north Burma in the spring of 1943 and later became G.O.C. 15th Army at the time of the Wingate airborne landings. This is what he says of the first operation:
Following the capture of Mandalay on May 1st, 1942, 18th Division was employed in mopping-up operations against remnants of the Chinese Forces in the Southern Shan States in East Burma. In the winter of 1942 15th Division relieved 55th Division and took over the defence of North Burma. Division H.Q. was at Maymyo and I had units under command stationed at Maymyo, Mandalay, Sagaing, Indaw, Mogaung and Myitkyina.
As there had been many cases of 'misunderstanding' between the local people and the Japanese forces, I planned to dispatch units under my command to the Sumprabum area to the north, to the Bhamo area to the east, and to the Chindwin area to the west for propaganda and pacification purposes. I was engaged in the execution of this plan for about one month after the end of February 1943.
The Wingate land counter attack of spring 1943 happened to coincide with the time of the above scheme. I had never anticipated such a risky plan of counter offensive on the part of the British Forces and I was therefore handicapped by the lack of the reserves with which to meet this threat. I had sent two companies which were in the Chindwin area at the time across the Zibyu Taungdan range. Both companies encountered units of the Wingate Force unexpectedly on the way. Units forming the main strength of the Wingate Force were encountered unexpectedly by the Nasu Battalion of 33rd Division and Major Nasu, the commanding officer, was killed in the ensuing action.
The place which the enemy had chosen as his crossing point of the Chindwin, opposite Sittaung, was the borderline of the defence sectors of 18th and 33rd Divisions and was not carefully watched. For this reason the Wingate Force crossed the Chindwin unopposed. Native reports overestimated the strength of this Force and it was therefore difficult to forecast its plans.
The question, whether or not the British would send more counter-attacking forces of this type on a large scale caused me grave concern at that time. Fortunately, such was not the case, and I was able to reduce my disposition to the east.
Since the area that we had to defend was very large in proportion to our strength and consisted mainly of jungle where the enemy could infiltrate freely during the dry season, we abandoned any idea of holding fixed defensive positions and devised measures to meet attacks in any part of the defence area.
General Numata was Chief of Staff Southern Army, which comprised most of South East Asia. His views are therefore more from the strategic standpoint of the overall campaign. He states that the Japanese reaction to the first Wingate expedition was to be offensive-spirited themselves and carry out similar operations against Imphal since:
(a) It was found as a result of the Wingate campaign and the Japanese operations in opposition thereto, that the terrain in North Burma was favourable for guerrilla warfare by small bodies of crack troops, but it was very difficult to defend the territory because the enemy could not easily be engaged. And,
(b) Under the circumstances, it would therefore be best to give up defensive tactics and resort to an offensive to destroy the enemy's bases for counter operations, such as Imphal and Kohima.
NB. Calvert famously recounted: "I had laughed at the gloomy forebodings of some of the officers of the Indian Division through which we had marched on our way to the Chindwin in 1943, 'that all you will do is to stir them up against us', never realizing that it would turn out true."
General Numata said that the Japanese Army did not consider it likely that the enemy would resort regularly to such expeditions. While a section of the staff held the view that another such expedition would be probable, the majority adhered to the first view cited above. Consequently the second Wingate expedition in March 1944 took the Japanese completely by surprise.
There was no special preparation to meet the expedition. He added that because of this lack of preparation, the second Wingate operation threw Japanese units into confusion, and that the higher command, without sufficient information, could only gather local units together more or less indiscriminately. Such time-saving measures resulted in the Japanese forces being repulsed everywhere. It was not until the beginning of April that the Japanese command realized that the enemy was engaged in a serious and large-scale penetrating operation with a powerful corps.
General Numata, on being questioned about the effect of the air-borne landings, stated that:
The reaction of the Japanese Army to this operation was so great that the Japanese 15th Army (the Army which included the three divisions detailed for the Imphal offensive), even thought of sparing from this force attacking Imphal a substantial force to annihilate the enemy unit and thus secure the safety of its rear.
This plan was not carried out. Instead railway units and line of communication guards were collected and deployed against the British troops; while on the other hand the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, which was guarding the Moulmein area south-east of Rangoon against a possible sea landing, was ordered to proceed north at all speed.
All those units were ordered to advance against the Allied air-borne troops around Mawlu (White City). 15th Army decided that the airborne forces intention was:
(a) To interrupt Japanese supply lines by cutting the Mandalay and Myitkyina railroad.
(b) To disturb the rear communications of the Japanese forces attacking Imphal.
(c) To counteract Japanese propaganda among the Burmese.
We became aware of the main landings on March 9th (some three days after the first wave of airborne Chindits had landed inside Burma) but information available then was insufficient, and we did not think that it was on a large scale. We became aware of its serious proportions only after the Japanese attacks were repulsed.
So in a strange way the actions of Wingate’s first Chindit operation was to confirm the Japanese belief, that attack was the best way forward when dealing with the question of India. This, as history has shown was their eventual undoing in this area and the beginning of the end within the theatre in general.
The first operation was on a small and experimental level, but it had shown what could be done with good organization and training. With the crucial benefit of air supply, the soldiers caused chaos in the midst their enemy, and for the first time began to sow the seeds of doubt into the psyche of their opponent.
A young Japanese Private soldier from the Burma campaign.
I have only been able to find one first hand account written by a Japanese soldier who encountered the Chindits of 1943. This comes in the form of the testimony of Lance Corporal Shinsaku Honma, from the book 'Tales by Japanese Soldiers'.
Chasing Chindits. An account of an engagement between Lance Corporal Shinsaku Honma, 2nd Machine Gun Company, 2nd Battalion, 215 Infantry Regiment, 33rd Division and a small Chindit force.
While we had been enjoying a peaceful occupation of Monywa, we were told that a British Force had penetrated into Burma, and our 2nd Battalion arrived at Kanbalu railway station (about 100km south east of Pinlebu) from Monywa on 23rd February 1943. It was on 3rd March that our battalion commander, Major Ichiro Nasu, was killed in an unexpected clash with Gurkhas in the jungle. In order to trap the enemy, ten men including myself from the Machine Gun Company, were attached to 7th Rifle Company and advanced towards Yu River.
We arrived at the village as ordered, but we found no sign of the enemy and the village people welcomed us and showed us dances by Burmese girls. When we woke the next morning there were no girls or children in the village and soon all the village people disappeared. At that time we did not suspect that our move had been disclosed to the enemy. It was when we were taking a sleep wearing only underpants that we heard the noise of British planes. I did not mind the sound as I thought they would go and bomb our rear areas. But then I noticed something strange and went outdoors and found the planes circling over the village. I cried out "Air Raid, Air Raid" and everybody, dressed only in underwear ran out of the village.
At that time a plane came diving on us, so I cried, "Quick, escape to the jungle as you are now, quickly." We left or rifles and kit in the house. Before we could run 50 metres, two bombs fell in the centre of the village and exploded. The second plane was already diving which caused a fire in a house and a palm tree fell down. We all sat still in the jungle. The fire was terrifying as well as the bombs. When the bombing by the fourth plane was over we carried our guns and ammunition and kit from the house. As soon as we entered the jungle, the planes started raking the ground with 20mm machine guns, but fortunately without any damage. The planes left and half of the houses in the village were burnt down.
A messenger came from 7th Company telling us to move to a jungle 1km northeast. Arriving there, we found the traces of camping and horse droppings. They must have been the enemy's. The place was suitable for camping with a water source and big trees. As the enemy were on a strict mission, they avoided entering villages and tried not to be informed on to the Japanese Army.
We spent the rest of the day building toilets and putting up tents. Another plane came and flew low over the village but did not attack it. We judged the plane came because the enemy was nearby.
Next morning suddenly we were ordered to fight. We carried mess kits wrapped in camouflage nets, canteens and 15 rounds of ammunition. We came to a place where there was a river 50m wide with water 30cm deep because of the dry season. To the right there was a wide marshland with reeds, and beyond it tall palm trees where probably there was a village.
The leading section suddenly started to run and we heard someone cry "Enemy", it was so unexpected that we had no time to fire. The enemy poured into the marshland. I assembled the gun so four men could carry it, though the platoon commander did not order this. We did not know the strength of the enemy. Lt Takizawa, commander 7th Company, ordered us to encircle the marshland and our machine gun was located in the centre on a cliff above the river.
A few minutes later I heard the sound of broken reeds about 40m ahead. Our plan was to fire at them with machine gun and grenade launchers and to threaten them that we were a large troop, and then the Rifle Sections would pursue them. My machine gun fired five rounds into the area where we heard the noises. Grenade launchers were also fired. Enemy soldiers came out one by one; all were captured without any bloodshed. The plan of Lt. Takizawa had been successful. We took them to the ox-cart road and examined their belongings. The senior man was a Medical Officer who had more than 200 silver rupees on him in a cotton bag.
We moved our camping site to a foot of a mountain 1.5km from the former position. For the next two or three days we had no information on the enemy. Probably on the fourth day, about fifteen enemy soldiers came in a single file, at a leisurely pace on the road at which our machine gun was aiming. All of us were tense. Distance, 200m. The enemy had not noticed us. On one side of the enemy was a river, the other was reed bushes. Our rifle units were ready to charge. I did the accurate aiming and awaited the order of the commander.
Chasing Chindits. An account of an engagement between Lance Corporal Shinsaku Honma, 2nd Machine Gun Company, 2nd Battalion, 215 Infantry Regiment, 33rd Division and a small Chindit force.
While we had been enjoying a peaceful occupation of Monywa, we were told that a British Force had penetrated into Burma, and our 2nd Battalion arrived at Kanbalu railway station (about 100km south east of Pinlebu) from Monywa on 23rd February 1943. It was on 3rd March that our battalion commander, Major Ichiro Nasu, was killed in an unexpected clash with Gurkhas in the jungle. In order to trap the enemy, ten men including myself from the Machine Gun Company, were attached to 7th Rifle Company and advanced towards Yu River.
We arrived at the village as ordered, but we found no sign of the enemy and the village people welcomed us and showed us dances by Burmese girls. When we woke the next morning there were no girls or children in the village and soon all the village people disappeared. At that time we did not suspect that our move had been disclosed to the enemy. It was when we were taking a sleep wearing only underpants that we heard the noise of British planes. I did not mind the sound as I thought they would go and bomb our rear areas. But then I noticed something strange and went outdoors and found the planes circling over the village. I cried out "Air Raid, Air Raid" and everybody, dressed only in underwear ran out of the village.
At that time a plane came diving on us, so I cried, "Quick, escape to the jungle as you are now, quickly." We left or rifles and kit in the house. Before we could run 50 metres, two bombs fell in the centre of the village and exploded. The second plane was already diving which caused a fire in a house and a palm tree fell down. We all sat still in the jungle. The fire was terrifying as well as the bombs. When the bombing by the fourth plane was over we carried our guns and ammunition and kit from the house. As soon as we entered the jungle, the planes started raking the ground with 20mm machine guns, but fortunately without any damage. The planes left and half of the houses in the village were burnt down.
A messenger came from 7th Company telling us to move to a jungle 1km northeast. Arriving there, we found the traces of camping and horse droppings. They must have been the enemy's. The place was suitable for camping with a water source and big trees. As the enemy were on a strict mission, they avoided entering villages and tried not to be informed on to the Japanese Army.
We spent the rest of the day building toilets and putting up tents. Another plane came and flew low over the village but did not attack it. We judged the plane came because the enemy was nearby.
Next morning suddenly we were ordered to fight. We carried mess kits wrapped in camouflage nets, canteens and 15 rounds of ammunition. We came to a place where there was a river 50m wide with water 30cm deep because of the dry season. To the right there was a wide marshland with reeds, and beyond it tall palm trees where probably there was a village.
The leading section suddenly started to run and we heard someone cry "Enemy", it was so unexpected that we had no time to fire. The enemy poured into the marshland. I assembled the gun so four men could carry it, though the platoon commander did not order this. We did not know the strength of the enemy. Lt Takizawa, commander 7th Company, ordered us to encircle the marshland and our machine gun was located in the centre on a cliff above the river.
A few minutes later I heard the sound of broken reeds about 40m ahead. Our plan was to fire at them with machine gun and grenade launchers and to threaten them that we were a large troop, and then the Rifle Sections would pursue them. My machine gun fired five rounds into the area where we heard the noises. Grenade launchers were also fired. Enemy soldiers came out one by one; all were captured without any bloodshed. The plan of Lt. Takizawa had been successful. We took them to the ox-cart road and examined their belongings. The senior man was a Medical Officer who had more than 200 silver rupees on him in a cotton bag.
We moved our camping site to a foot of a mountain 1.5km from the former position. For the next two or three days we had no information on the enemy. Probably on the fourth day, about fifteen enemy soldiers came in a single file, at a leisurely pace on the road at which our machine gun was aiming. All of us were tense. Distance, 200m. The enemy had not noticed us. On one side of the enemy was a river, the other was reed bushes. Our rifle units were ready to charge. I did the accurate aiming and awaited the order of the commander.
A Japanese Company march through a chaung with tall reeds on both sides.
Shinsaku's testimony concludes:
I pressed the trigger as soon as I heard Lt. Takizawa's order, “Fire", before I had fired a single round the entire enemy lay flat on the ground. There happened to be drift wood nearby and the enemy hid behind it. While I was consulting with the section leader whether I should fire to intimidate them, Lt. Sakamaki came running to us holding his Japanese sword in one hand and ordering me to cover the charge of the rifle units.
As five or six men who were still on the road started to move, I fired about twenty bullets. A white cloth tied to a stick appeared behind the driftwood and was waved. The Rifle Platoon advanced with bayonets fixed. There were only eight men behind the driftwood; all were captured. It was the officer who held out the white flag. The remaining fifteen men ran into the reeds. I thought there should be seven or eight in there. Around midnight I heard men walking in the river about 50m below our gun, so everybody took up their positions. But it was so dark that we could not see 10m ahead. They were lucky, they must have returned to India safely.
Because our sleep was disturbed we slept on till well after breakfast. At about 10 o’ clock I was roused by the sentry, alarm!! Again seven or eight soldiers came walking leisurely with rifles on shoulder straps. I knew I should not let them escape into the jungle again. If they reached the driftwood it would be a repeat of yesterday. I aimed exactly at the waist of the man in front, so that even if he lay flat the bullets would hit the men in the rear. I reported "Enemy" but the order to shoot did not come.
I am supposed to fire by the order of the platoon leader. I made up my mind that I would not care to be scolded later, and pressed the trigger. The leading three men fell down one by one. Then I moved my aim to the remaining men who lay flat and fired another thirty bullets; 7th Company ran to the enemy and found two men killed and five wounded. I was impressed by the excellent performance of the type 92 medium machine gun. The enemy soldiers captured yesterday and today were delivered to battalion headquarters at Mawleik.
NB. The circumstances described by Lance Corporal Shinsaku were reminiscent of several skirmishes and actions against the Chindits, I am naturally intrigued to know who these men were and which Chindit column they belonged to. The only Medical Officer captured in similar circumstances to those described was Major Raymond Ramsay and he would spend the next two years a POW in Rangoon Jail.
My thanks must go to the late John Nunneley for his help in making Shinsaku's testimony available. For more details about John Nunneley and his Army career, please click on the link below:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/10331623/John-Nunneley.html
I would also like to thank Tom Webb for providing the photographs of the Japanese Platoon and Private soldier. Tom's original Regiment was the Queens, Royal West Surreys, but he fought in Burma as Tank Infantry with the Punjabis as part of the 19th Indian Division, known as the 'Daggers'.
Copyright © Steve Fogden 2013.
I pressed the trigger as soon as I heard Lt. Takizawa's order, “Fire", before I had fired a single round the entire enemy lay flat on the ground. There happened to be drift wood nearby and the enemy hid behind it. While I was consulting with the section leader whether I should fire to intimidate them, Lt. Sakamaki came running to us holding his Japanese sword in one hand and ordering me to cover the charge of the rifle units.
As five or six men who were still on the road started to move, I fired about twenty bullets. A white cloth tied to a stick appeared behind the driftwood and was waved. The Rifle Platoon advanced with bayonets fixed. There were only eight men behind the driftwood; all were captured. It was the officer who held out the white flag. The remaining fifteen men ran into the reeds. I thought there should be seven or eight in there. Around midnight I heard men walking in the river about 50m below our gun, so everybody took up their positions. But it was so dark that we could not see 10m ahead. They were lucky, they must have returned to India safely.
Because our sleep was disturbed we slept on till well after breakfast. At about 10 o’ clock I was roused by the sentry, alarm!! Again seven or eight soldiers came walking leisurely with rifles on shoulder straps. I knew I should not let them escape into the jungle again. If they reached the driftwood it would be a repeat of yesterday. I aimed exactly at the waist of the man in front, so that even if he lay flat the bullets would hit the men in the rear. I reported "Enemy" but the order to shoot did not come.
I am supposed to fire by the order of the platoon leader. I made up my mind that I would not care to be scolded later, and pressed the trigger. The leading three men fell down one by one. Then I moved my aim to the remaining men who lay flat and fired another thirty bullets; 7th Company ran to the enemy and found two men killed and five wounded. I was impressed by the excellent performance of the type 92 medium machine gun. The enemy soldiers captured yesterday and today were delivered to battalion headquarters at Mawleik.
NB. The circumstances described by Lance Corporal Shinsaku were reminiscent of several skirmishes and actions against the Chindits, I am naturally intrigued to know who these men were and which Chindit column they belonged to. The only Medical Officer captured in similar circumstances to those described was Major Raymond Ramsay and he would spend the next two years a POW in Rangoon Jail.
My thanks must go to the late John Nunneley for his help in making Shinsaku's testimony available. For more details about John Nunneley and his Army career, please click on the link below:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/10331623/John-Nunneley.html
I would also like to thank Tom Webb for providing the photographs of the Japanese Platoon and Private soldier. Tom's original Regiment was the Queens, Royal West Surreys, but he fought in Burma as Tank Infantry with the Punjabis as part of the 19th Indian Division, known as the 'Daggers'.
Copyright © Steve Fogden 2013.